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Abstract: Automotive electrical/electronic 
architectures need to perform more and more 
functions that are mapped onto many different 
electronic control units (ECU) because of their 
different safety levels or different application 
domains (body, powertrain, multimedia, etc.). 
Freedom of interference is required to comply with 
the upcoming ISO 26262 standard for mixing 
different ASIL levels on the same ECU and is also 
required to cope with the safe integration of software 
from different suppliers. PharOS provides dedicated 
software partitioning mechanisms as well as 
controlled and efficient resource sharing by 
construction, from the design to the implementation 
stages. The main features of PharOS, contributing to 
this property, are presented in this paper as well as 
the results on its application an industry-driven case 
study and associated future prospects. 
Keywords: dependability and safety, real-time 
systems, multi-core, automotive embedded software. 
1. Introduction 
Automotive electrical/electronic architectures need to 
perform more and more functions that are mapped 
onto many different electronic control units (ECU) 
because they have different safety levels or different 
application domains (body, powertrain, multimedia, 
etc.). Next-generation vehicles need reduced 
development costs and reduced energy consumption 
and this can be achieved by reducing the number of 
embedded ECUs [1]. 
This evolution of automotive architectures requires, 
firstly, ECUs with more computing power. Today 
microcontroller suppliers can offer multi-core 
architectures, where computing power is increased 
by adding cores rather than by over-clocking the 
CPU and so for the same CPU capability, this 
solution increases much less the power consumed. 
However, carmakers and automotive suppliers lack 
the appropriate support tools to obtain the full benefit 
from these new paralleled architectures without 
compromising safety requirements. 
Secondly, non-interference among different functions 
of “merged” ECUs must be ensured. It is required 
also to comply with the upcoming ISO 26262 
standard and to solve the problem of mixing different 
ASIL levels on the same ECU. Freedom from 
interference is also a property required to cope with 
the actual way of integrating software from different 
suppliers in automotive industry. It calls for dedicated 
software partitioning mechanisms as well as 
controlled and efficient resource sharing. 
Standard approaches in automotive software 
architectures, like the AUTOSAR-based ones, 
address some of these requirements partially, such 
as software modularity and portability, but do not yet 
provide complete and proved solutions to safety 
aspects related to non-interference and optimal use 
of multi-core microcontrollers.  
To this aim, CEA LIST has developed, in 
collaboration with Delphi, PharOS, a technology for 
design and implementation of safe embedded real-
time multi-core systems. It shares the same parallel 
time-triggered and safe-by-construction paradigms of 
the OASIS technology [2] but coping with the specific 
automotive requirements. Such approaches allow 
conciliating efficient parallelism management and 
real-time determinism [3]. 
PharOS provides safety-assisted real-time design, 
temporal & spatial partitioning mechanisms and 
dual-core support, optimized in terms of memory 
footprint and computing performance required by the 
highly-constrained automotive environment. 
The icing on the cake is that PharOS can effectively 
reduce the development cost by simplifying the 
validation of components and limiting the need of 
global system revalidation. 
This paper will present on one hand the main 
features of PharOS easing the design and 
implementation of safe-by-construction and highly 
available embedded real-time systems and on the 
other hand the results and future perspectives in the 
automotive domain. 
2. PharOS execution and protection features 
A real-time system coordinates elementary activities 
(such as data acquisitions/actuations from/to the 
environment or computations) that are performed by 
processing units. Each elementary activity has its 
associated temporal constraints, which can be 
derived or specified explicitly: an activation rhythm 
(not necessarily periodic), a time interval when the 
activity has to be performed (i.e. an earliest start 
date and a deadline), and dependencies with others 
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activities (communications, atomic requests). The 
coordination among all activities implies 
synchronization on the physical (i.e. real) time—to 
ensure the temporal coherence—and 
synchronization of the sequential and conditional 
activities. Thus, temporal distribution of different 
activities must be controlled and, consequently, 
defined by the task model. 
Furthermore, to allow valid offline verification (e.g. 
proofs, tests, etc.), the system must be deterministic. 
Indeed, predictability and reproducibility of software 
behavior in both temporal and logical domains 
guarantees the coherence between, offline analysis 
and tests, on one hand, and actual execution, on the 
other. To ensure such determinism, sources of 
asynchronism, such as scheduling (e.g. preemption), 
variation of the execution time, and communication 
delays must be taken into account at the design level 
in order to control interactions among tasks. 
Therefore, all temporal constraints on interactions 
must be explicitly provided by the tasks model. 
2.1. Observability Principles 
When asynchronism is not accounted for at design 
level, interactions can result in out-of-date or 
inconsistent data being manipulated, which can lead 
to non-reproducible behavior or failures. Indeed, in 
absence of synchronization mechanisms, it is 
impossible to know whether production processing is 
complete or not. Similarly, consulted data must be 
consistent throughout the associated consumption 
processing. Furthermore, expiration rules must be 
provided in order to compute bounds for the size of 
communication buffers. 
An observation of a temporal variable is a couple 
(X,V) where X is the value of the variable and V is 
the formal visibility instant of this value. 
Communications are then based on the following 
principles (see Figure 1): 
• A variable X is visible only from its visibility 
instant V. 
• An observed value of a variable X is not 
modifiable, neither by its producer nor by 
consumers. 
• An observed value of a variable X must 
remain available until a consumer can use it. 
 
Figure 1. Observability principles 
Consider two communicating tasks shown in Figure 
1. Assume that Task 1 produces a new value for the 
variable X once in the interval [T0,T2[ and once in the 
interval [T2,T4[; Task 2 consults the value of X at 
some current date Tc ∈ [T3,T5[. As the date Tc is a 
priori unknown, the determinism principle requires 
that the value of the variable X at the date Tc is equal 
to the value that was the last one observed at the 
date T3. Similarly, this last value is given by the 
observation (X, T2). In other words, the consulted 
value of a variable is always a past one and equal to 
its value at the last formal visibility date less than or 
equal to the earliest start date of the current time 
interval of the consulting task.  
2.2. Time- and Event-Triggered Model 
PharOS is based on a Time-Triggered (TT) 
execution paradigm [2][5]. The system observes the 
environment and initiates its activities at some 
predetermined points of the globally synchronized 
time. For each task, its time-scale, observations, and 
interactions are defined at the design step, allowing 
a precise control at the execution of the system. 
In the automotive domain, many activities (e.g. 
signal capture) have temporal constraints with 
durations smaller than few microseconds. Hardware 
performance may not allow addressing such 
activities with Time-Triggered paradigm. Therefore, 
in addition to Time-Triggered execution, PharOS 
also extends the principles described in the previous 
section to Event-Triggered (ET) activities. 
In PharOS, the decomposition in tasks corresponds 
exactly to the processing that should be executed in 
parallel (i.e. activities that are not directly 
dependent). Moreover, a task can be defined in time-
triggered domain or in event-triggered one. The 
design in PharOS imposes no constraint on the 
decomposition of an application in tasks, nor 
triggering domains.  
2.2.1. Time-Triggered tasks 
A TT task—also called an agent—is an autonomous 
entity defined by a deterministic labeled transition 
system, where labels represent elementary activities 
(denoted EA) representing sequential computation. 
Each EA has an associated deadline D, i.e. its latest 
end instant and a quota Q, its maximum authorized 
execution duration. An EA is executed within a 
temporal window w defined by an interval [Ts,Tt[ (see 
Figure 2), where Ts is the earliest start date, and Tt is 
the latest termination date of the activity.  
All dates belong to a predetermined subset of ticks 
of real-time clocks defined in the system. Each clock 
is a couple (P, d), where P is the period and the d 
initial phase.  
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Figure 2. TT tasks model 
By default the deadline D is equal to Tt or computed 
according to different execution paths. It can also be 
explicitly specified by the designer for a finer control 
of jitter and activation delay. The quota Q is the 
maximal authorized execution duration, i.e. the 
inequality ∑
=
>
N
i
iqQ
1
 is controlled at runtime, where iq is 
the execution time of the executed EA part and N is 
the total number of executed parts (preemptive 
system).  
In the PharOS approach, the quota has no impact on 
application design, but is only used for monitoring 
and, by offline tools, to perform the CPU sizing 
analysis: to verify whether hardware performance is 
sufficient for the application requirements or not (and 
to compute the associated maximum CPU load). 
Thus, in order to ensure timeliness of elementary 
activities, quotas represent upper bounds of their 
WCET. Quota violation is therefore an error and will 
be managed as described in section 3.3. 
An execution of an agent is an infinite trace of its 
defining transition system. An execution defines a 
sequence of temporal windows (denoted W) derived 
from the constraints specified at design phase and 
such that wsT of the current temporal window w ∈ W 
is equal to 1wfT −  of the previous window 
denoted 1w − .  
The following temporal constraints can be 
expressed, monitored, and guaranteed by the 
system (see Figure 2): 
• Activation delay ( A∆ )—the minimum delay 
between executions of two consecutive 
elementary activities: at the latest, the first 
activity must finish before wD , whereas the 
second cannot start before 1wsT + . Hence, { }WwDTA wws ∈−=∆ + |min 1 . 
• Jitter ( J∆ )—the maximum delay between 
executions of two consecutive elementary 
activities: at the earliest, the first activity can 
finish at wsT  (zero, i.e. negligible, execution 
time); similarly, the second must start before 
1+wD . Hence, { }WwTDJ wsw ∈−=∆ + |max 1 . 
The basic temporal constraints, such as the 
deadlines and sizes of temporal windows (i.e., Tt –
 Ts), are directly incorporated in the task specification 
allowing to describe behaviors according to external 
events (e.g. received network frame) or internal (e.g. 
state of local variable). Therefore, each agent can 
adopt dynamic behaviors, periodic or not, regular or 
not for which all possible sequence combinations are 
known and incorporated in a graph (see section 3.1).  
Although each TT task must have an associated 
basic clock, all the clocks are defined globally for the 
application and can be used by all TT tasks for 
synchronization. Thus, tasks can be synchronized 
(see Figure 3): 
• At system start (potentially with a bounded 
phase shift)—first of all, the global reference 
of the application is specified as a formal 
instant called inittime; then a start delay S∆  
relative to inittime is associated to each task. 
It is important to observe that inittime and 
S∆  need not necessarily belong to the same 
clock. Hence, the starting instant of a task is 
given by T0 + S∆ , where T0  is the last 
formal instant on the clock of S∆  before 
inittime. 
• At a specified instant on any given clock. For 
example, the synchronization between 
Agent 1 and Agent 2 in Figure 3 is obtained 
by Agent 1 advancing to the fourth and 
Agent 2 to the second next tick on the clock 
C10. 
 
Figure 3. Tasks synchronization 
2.2.2. Event-Triggered tasks 
An ET task—also called a handler—runs one 
elementary action when an external event is raised 
and enables a hardware interrupt. The associated 
computation is executed in a growing temporal 
window [ [fe TT , , where eT is the earliest date when 
the event can occur, whereas fT  is the termination 
instant unknown until the event does occur and 
defined by oof TT ∆+=  with oT  the measured 
effective occurrence date and o∆  the minimum 
interval with at most N occurrences of the same 
event. Similarly to TT tasks, a quota Q (an upper 
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bound for the WCET) can be specified for the 
execution time of a handler. 
 
Figure 4. ET tasks model 
Altogether, the above parameters specify the largest 
acceptable workload. 
2.3. Temporal communication 
All communications/interactions among tasks are 
explicitly described at design phase and incorporate 
temporal aspects. The following temporal constraints 
can be specified and controlled: 
• Age delay is the maximum delay from which 
the consumed or sent value (the earliest 
value) has been produced. 
• Delay before injection is the maximum delay 
between effective event occurrence and its 
processing by the system. This delay also 
comprises the injection of data from ET 
domain to the TT one. 
• Expedition delay is the maximum delay 
between data production and its delivery to 
the external environment. 
• Expiration delay is the maximum delay from 
which the data becomes obsolete. 
All these constraints (based on the observability 
principles) associated with temporal behaviors of 
each task provide means for expression and control 
of end-to-end temporal constraints, i.e. maximum 
delay between data acquisition and associated 
actions.  
On the basis of the communication principles 
presented above, PharOS provides the following 
communications mechanisms within the TT domain: 
• Temporal variables are real-time data flows: 
values, available to all agents, stored and 
updated by a single writer—the owner 
agent—at a predetermined temporal rhythm. 
• Temporal messages represent a mechanism 
for sending typed messages with associated 
visibility dates. 
• Temporal flags are a special case of 
temporal messages for notifying only event 
(e.g. implicit boolean value) without 
associated data (for optimization purposes).  
• Temporal blackboards generalize the first 
two above mechanisms to allow several 
agents to contribute to the same temporal 
variable at a bit granularity. 
ET <=> TT (1 agent to 1 handler, and reciprocally) 
define mechanisms derived from temporal variables 
and messages to exchange data between the two 
domains.  
3. Temporal and spatial partitioning 
To implement partitioning, the execution is structured 
in different contexts (called execution context) in 
PharOS: 
• An application layer (compounded of 
different tasks), that executes the main 
functions (there is one applicative execution 
context per task), 
• A system layer that manages task execution 
control and inter-task communications (there 
is one system execution context per task), 
• A micro-kernel that manages time and task 
context switching (it is the only atomic 
execution context). 
 
The kernel is the association of the micro-kernel and 
the system layer and is designed to be independent 
of any application. The application layer is 
compounded of two execution domains:  
• Time-triggered (TT) tasks, where processing 
is activated only by time evolution, 
• Event-triggered (ET) tasks (also called 
handlers), where processing is activated on 
the occurrence of an associated event 
(Input/Output interrupt). This execution 
paradigm is typically required when the 
temporal rhythm of events is too tight to be 
met by TT tasks (limited hardware 
performance). 
The kernel implements generic spatial and temporal 
partitioning mechanisms [4] to protect each 
execution context. It uses the protection runtime 
information (e.g. MPU descriptors, timers, temporal 
diagram) automatically extracted from functional and 
sizing constraints provided at software design phase. 
The protection mechanisms are configured for: 
earliest/nearest error detection and confinement, 
non-interference between application and system 
layers, nor between domains, nor among 
applications, i.e. TT and ET tasks. 
 
3.1. Temporal partitioning 
From the design step, offline analysis of the global 
software sizing can be performed in order to verify 
whether provided hardware performance is adequate 
to satisfy application constraints [2][6]. The 
guarantee that all the tasks can meet their temporal 
constraints is provided for both nominal and failure 
contexts. For this analysis to be relevant the 
execution of the system must conform to the 
analyzed design, including the associated temporal 
constraints. The following errors must be detected: 
=T2T1e
EA
Q
∆o
Time
T1o
Event occurrence
e
T1f
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• Local sizing error: task execution 
consumes more time than expected. This 
error must have no impact on other 
tasks. 
• Global sizing error: a task reaches its 
deadline. Required CPU load is therefore 
greater than hardware capabilities. An 
increase of CPU quartz would suffice in 
the case of an error in the global CPU 
load calculation performed during offline 
analysis. Such operation is performed 
without changing the design of the 
application. 
• Flow execution error: a task attempts to 
take an execution path inconsistent with 
its specification. 
In PharOS, detection of these errors is performed by 
monitoring the deadlines, quotas, and execution 
sequences for each task.  
3.1.1. Deadline monitoring 
In the TT domain, the system observes its 
environment and initiates processing operations at 
recurring, although not necessarily periodic, 
predetermined instants in time. Therefore, effective 
execution takes place between two instants—an 
earliest start date and a latest termination date—split 
potentially into several execution parts due to pre-
emptive scheduling policy (see Figure 5). Execution 
support uses therefore a hardware timer to ensure 
EA termination at the associated deadline, otherwise 
an error is raised.   
 
Figure 5. Deadline monitoring 
The same—hardware timer—mechanism is used to 
ensure timely termination of handlers in the ET 
domain. The main difference is that the deadline for 
a handler is determined at the occurrence of its 
associated interrupt.  
3.1.2. Execution time monitoring 
CPU is a shared resource for which scheduling 
policy determines, at every instant, which tasks can 
use it. Only one task can execute on a given CPU at 
any given moment; other tasks are waiting.  It is 
therefore important to ensure that CPU is correctly 
released by the tasks.  
Tasks execution time is monitored in order to ensure 
that each task uses no more than the quota it has 
been assigned at design step. If a task attempts to 
use more time, an exception is raised by the kernel 
(see Figure 6). Notice that this implies that the 
specified execution time of each activity must be 
strictly positive, whether it belongs to the applicative 
or the system layer.  
 
Figure 6. Quota monitoring 
Each fraction of the execution time consumed by the 
system layer (communication and monitoring) is 
attributed to the task for which the processing is 
performed. Observe, in particular, that a specific time 
margin, attributed to tasks, is reserved for the 
monitoring of the quotas by the micro-kernel.  
Similarly to deadlines, the monitoring of quotas is 
implemented by a hardware timer which is set when 
a task is executed.  
3.1.3. Execution sequence monitoring 
The temporal behavior of tasks and handlers is 
monitored in order to verify that it conforms to the 
specified one. To avoid misinterpretation by 
developers, the temporal model is automatically 
extracted from the application design and stored in a 
runtime table; this information supplies online 
verification mechanisms to check correctness of 
processing sequence and their associated temporal 
constraints.  
The labeled transition system describing a task 
encompasses its complete temporal behavior and 
includes all synchronization points that this task can 
reach. For each task, an extended representation, 
independent from other tasks, is obtained by 
unfolding this transition system and computing a 
temporal congruence on its states. The resulting 
temporal diagram (illustrated in Figure 7) is an 
optimized model for behavior used by the system 
layer to control the execution of a task. This diagram 
allows one to precisely place each elementary 
activity in a corresponding temporal window. 
The temporal diagram in Figure 7 illustrates a cyclic 
task for which temporal behavior alternates 
according to a conditional test. This diagram has two 
types of nodes: adv and upd, corresponding 
respectively setting and updating the temporal 
window of the current activity.  
A system call function sysCall_xxx_n(), generated 
separately for each transition (cf. the generated code 
in the right-hand side of Figure 7), passes the index 
of the target node of the temporal diagram to the 
system layer. The diagram itself is stored in read-
only memory and cannot be modified. The system 
layer verifies whether the task can move from the 
current node to the target one while respecting the 
associated constraints thereby controlling the 
conformity of the execution to the design 
specifications.  
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Figure 7. Temporal behavior monitoring 
In the ET domain, all useful interrupt sources are 
explicitly identified; other unused interrupts are 
disabled. Therefore, apart from timer interrupts used 
for time management, each interrupt must start an 
appropriated processing, encapsulated in a known 
and controlled temporal window: the interrupt must 
be expected. For this, minimum time interval (the 
shortest acceptable in terms of CPU load) between a 
given number of occurrences of the same interrupt 
must be specified at the design stage. Then, a 
system automaton ensures that their executions are 
performed according to occurrence’s order of the 
respective events. Based on this information, 
support tools generate appropriate code to perform 
occurrence monitoring through dedicated hardware 
timer channel. 
3.1.4. Timer implementation 
Timer implementation in the Time-Triggered domain 
of PharOS is straightforward. Indeed, one timer is 
sufficient for monitoring both deadlines and quotas of 
task activities. Hence, a hardware timer can always 
be used. This timer is always enabled and reset 
each time the execution leaves the microkernel. 
In the Event-Triggered domain, each handler has a 
specified quota used for monitoring. Hence a 
separate timer might be necessary for each interrupt 
type in order to optimize their execution time. 
However, timer resources may be insufficient or 
microcontroller performance too tight. Different 
implementations are possible. In the optimal case, a 
dedicated or shared timer can be set while ensuring 
time countdown coherency policy: time must only be 
deducted when the handler is effectively executed. 
In some other cases, a software mechanism must be 
implemented by checking whether, when handler is 
executed, its previous execution was already 
terminated or not. 
3.2 Spatial partitioning 
3.2.1. Code and data partitioning 
An error occurring during the execution of a task 
should impact neither the other tasks, nor the kernel. 
This can be ensured by the hardware memory 
protection, provided clear and explicit segmentation 
of the executable code: text and data sections of 
object files must be identified in order to clearly 
separate variable and constant data, and the 
application code.  
In PharOS, data naming rules are used in order to 
assist this identification. In addition, specific 
information for the backend compiler can be included 
in the source code to specify membership of 
sections. Sections can then be aggregated into 
uniform ones depending on the execution context: 
• produced data and buffers, 
• consumed data and buffers, 
• functions. 
These sections are then placed in the memory 
according to the following criteria: 
• Access performance of the memory 
support (code or data is frequently used). 
• Shared memory between cores when 
multi-core architecture is targeted, 
• Implicit protection provided by the 
memory support such as flash memory. 
(indeed, such memory requires use of 
specific driver to distort it), 
• Similarity of the required memory access 
rights for different elements. 
All the above operations depend on the memory 
protection abilities provided by the hardware unit. 
3.2.2. Execution support protection 
Hardware execution mode mechanism is used to 
prevent applications from interfering with the system 
layer. Such mechanism authorizes execution of 
specific instructions and access to memory regions 
(through configuration of memory protection unit 
descriptors) only according to specific 
microcontroller mode. At least two execution modes 
must be distinguished by the hardware: 
• Supervisor mode—to restrict access to 
the internal registers (e.g. stack pointer 
store/load instructions, memory 
management unit instructions) and 
peripheral device registers (INT, MPU, 
timers, etc.) used for the execution. 
• User mode—for the application software. 
 
System access is only possible through a unique 
interface: by the application, based on trap calling 
(automatically generated at compilation stage), and 
by the micro-kernel via timer interrupt to manage 
scheduling as illustrated in Figure 8 (SL means 
System layer and µN means Micro-Kernel in the 
following figures). 
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Figure 8. Execution modes 
3.2.3. Memory access protection 
A strict memory protection policy must be 
implemented in order to protect data and code 
sections against spurious read, write or/and execute 
attempts. This protection is essential to ensure 
predictable and reproducible behavior even for the 
degraded modes. This protection is defined with the 
memory protection unit (MPU), where rights 
associated with execution modes provided by the 
microprocessor are applied dynamically and 
swapped upon context switch to allow appropriate 
memory access for the enabled context, as 
illustrated in Figure 9 (the current task is shown on 
the left-hand side for each context). 
 
Figure 9. Memory rights 
Write access protection 
Write access protection is the most important one. 
Indeed, task or system state alteration can only be 
confirmed by writing of data in memory or register. 
Applicative right accesses must therefore restrict at 
the necessary and sufficient need whatever 
protection abilities level. 
Read and execution access protection 
A priori, write access protection is sufficient for some 
safety-related purposes. However, read and execute 
accesses should not be restricted to increase the 
execution determinism, particularly in case of failure. 
Task should not be able to access unrelated memory 
area. Hence, for optimal protection, memory area 
consulted or executed by a context must be clearly 
identified. However, depending on hardware 
capacity, degraded protection can be used, where 
read access rights are extended: first for constant 
data and code, then for variable data. To be 
coherent with hardware capabilities, memory 
protection is highly correlated with the code and data 
segmentation. 
3.3. Failure management 
Whenever an error is detected and confined, a 
specific failure management policy must be applied. 
Based on the presented protection mechanisms, 
PharOS ensures that errors are detected and 
confined in their source execution context. The 
system then remains stable and continues its 
execution in a degraded mode. Degraded behavior 
is specified at design stage with the same 
requirements as in the nominal behavior. PharOS 
allows performing specific recovery procedures.  
3.3.1. Degraded behavior 
When a faulty task is shut down upon detection and 
confinement of an error, other tasks can still be 
affected if their behaviors depend on the data 
produced by this task. In order to control such error 
propagation, PharOS provides two kinds of 
mechanisms to specify degraded behavior: 
• Task grouping—confinement area is defined 
over a set of tasks. Thus, if one task fails, all 
tasks of the group are shut down. This is 
necessary when several tasks compose the 
same application or specification of the 
degraded behavior for correct tasks is 
impossible. 
• Task state broadcasting—for tasks 
producing real-time data flows, data 
extrapolation can be realized by the system 
to ensure data coherency. Consumer tasks 
are therefore notified of the state of the 
producer (faulty or correct) and the 
pertinence of data. To ensure real-time 
coherence of the data-state pair, the state 
information is broadcasted to consumers 
through the real-time data flow mechanisms. 
3.3.2. Recovery policy 
PharOS provides a recovery mechanism that is 
performed at the faulty task (or group) level without 
affecting the functions of the other tasks. Moreover, 
it is realized with temporal constraints to ensure 
restarting within a controlled delay.  
This recovery mechanism is provided by the kernel. 
The first step consists in reinitializing the context of 
the task (stacks, registers, etc.) and communication 
mechanisms without impacting actual consumed 
values. The second step consists in re-integrating 
tasks in scheduling lists. For this, a restart instant is 
computed from a delay specified over a congruent 
cycle, i.e. in a synchronized way consistent with the 
offline computed CPU load. 
When a task is restarted, relevant information are 
provided to the application level to enable choosing 
between the nominal behavior (executed at the 
system initialization and start) or a specific 
(degraded) one, as all behaviors, including those 
after a retart, are described in the design. In 
particular, this allows correct re-initialization of local 
variables. 
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3.3.3. Logging mechanisms 
Safe and controlled resource sharing allows 
reporting the error source for later diagnostic 
operation.1 For TT tasks failures, the nature of the 
error as well as the corresponding location in code 
(given by the temporal execution diagram) can be 
reported; for ET tasks—information about the 
interrupt vector. The global determinism ensured by 
PharOS allows enhanced error identification, and 
better verification and validation support during 
software development. 
4. Dual-core support 
The dual-core hardware architectures used for 
microcontrollers dedicated to automotive ECU 
provides intrinsic execution parallelism. 
4.1. PharOS execution model 
In order to optimize the allocation of the CPU time to 
application execution, PharOS provides an execution 
model based on the following two principles: 
• Task execution must be interrupted only 
when necessary. 
• Ready tasks must be executed whenever 
possible. 
The microkernel is split between cores2 in order to 
perform system execution in parallel with application 
execution: 
• The control core manages time evolution 
and scheduling (lists of ready and pending 
TT tasks). 
• The computing core executes TT tasks, with 
appropriate task context switching 
management, according to the list of ready 
tasks. 
The control core is also in charge of the execution of 
handlers, thus avoiding any perturbation of the 
execution of TT tasks. Therefore, CPU time is 
preserved for the execution of TT tasks; no time is 
consumed for task's context switching and system 
process execution.  
Figure 10 illustrates the PharOS dual-core execution 
principle. The computing core runs TT tasks from the 
list of ready tasks (contexts), which is updated by the 
control core. Assume that two agents AG1 and AG2 
are to be executed in the temporal window [T0, T1[. 
When AG1 terminates its elementary action the 
computing core switches execution to AG2. Apart 
from changing the task contexts (by the micro-kernel 
layer), this operation involves operations such as, for 
example, updating the list of ready tasks. In the 
                                                          
1
 The failure reports are stored in an EEPROM. 
2
 These microkernel features for multi-cores are integrated into a patent. 
 
single-core context, all these operations are 
performed by the same core, which implies, in 
particular, a number of additional context switches. 
The separation of control from computing reduces 
the number of context switches and control 
computations on the computing core, saving time for 
execution of application tasks. 
To summarize, the control core relieves the 
computing one from managing the time evolution 
and TT scheduling, as well as processing the 
interrupts from the I/O operations. Moreover no 
context switching is required between agents and 
handlers.  
 
Figure 10. Dual-core execution principles 
4.2. Programming model 
The dual-core architecture underlying the system 
execution is completely transparent for developers, 
thus simplifying the design phase. In particular, no 
API is needed for specifying processing on the 
control core or mapping of tasks. Developers 
describe only nature of tasks, that is whether a task 
is Time-Triggered or Event-Triggered, and provide 
the associated temporal and functional constraints. 
The mapping is implicit and automatically 
determined from the design description. 
  
5. Case study and results 
An ECU developed for PSA Peugeot Citroen with an 
OSEK OS on the S12XS (Freescale microcontroller, 
single HC12 core) has been redeveloped partially, 
using PharOS on the S12XE (double core, pin to pin 
compatible with S12XS). 
The case study is a subset of an automotive 
application that includes: some functions for system 
outputs command, CAN communication bus, 
sensors signal measurements and voltage control. 
The whole application is composed of 7 TT tasks 
(including CAN LS driver) and 2 handlers. TT tasks 
have different dynamic behaviors and scales from 
hundreds of microseconds to several seconds, ET 
ones from a few microseconds to several 
milliseconds. Handlers indeed measure the duty 
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cycle of a 400 Hz PWM signal and catch the signal 
state after a precise exclusion time with a filtering 
policy. CAN driver is totally integrated in the TT 
domain, even though the CAN frames are received 
in an event way  
The sample application that is described below 
covers some representative functions extracted from 
this automotive industrial case study. 
5.1. Sample application 
This application includes some functions of system 
outputs commands, communication through a CAN 
LS bus and sensors signal measurements.  
 
Figure 11. Sample application 
The application consists of 6 TT tasks (including 
CAN LS driver) and 1 ET handler (see Figure 11 and 
Figure 15): 
• AgCanRx: Reception management of CAN 
LowSpeed (125 kbits/s) driver. Its design is 
implemented to ensure by construction that 
there is no loss of received messages due to 
hardware buffer overflows and no work 
overload due to CAN bursts. AgCanRx has a 
period of 1 ms followed by a 500 µs deadline 
in order to ensure a maximum jitter of 
message extraction processing under 1.5 
ms. 
• AgPwmOut: Production of the duty cycle 
according to an external value. This process 
is performed only if beams command is set 
to on (15 ms period); otherwise AgPwmOut 
periodically checks for a presence of a new 
command (5 ms period for improved 
reactivity).  
• AgCmd: Management of the output signals 
for the light beams and the wiper according 
to the command received from CAN. 
• AgCanTx: Transmission management of 
CAN LowSpeed driver. Its design is 
implemented to ensure by construction that 
message transmission is precise and 
guaranteed. AgCanTx has a period of 5 ms 
to satisfy transmission constraints of the new 
values produced by AgPwmIn and AgWAF.  
• AgWAF: Retrieval of the fix stop position of 
the wiper and its communication over the 
CAN network via AgCanTx 
• itECT: ET task for measurement of a duty 
cycle of a  400 Hz PWM signal. Time scale 
(from some microseconds to 2.5 ms) 
required for this signal processing is too 
small (compared to the provided frequency 
range) to be treated in the TT domain. Thus, 
itECT extracts timers registers value (e.g. 
instants) noted by hardware on occurrence 
of rising and falling edges of the measured 
PWM signal (400 MHz). Then, it 
communicates these acquisitions to 
AgPwmIn by blocks of 5. System is then 
configured to tolerate 2 interrupts by period 
of 2.5 ms. 
• AgPwmIn: Computation of the duty cycle 
based on the instants provided by itECT and 
communication of the result over the CAN 
network via AgCanTx. 
TT tasks have different dynamic behaviors, 
according to internal or external state/command, and 
different time scales from 500 microseconds to 
several milliseconds.  
5.2. Error injection results 
To stress the error detection mechanisms and the 
recovery management, 3 kinds of errors were 
injected at AgWAF level:  
• A wrong memory access (see Figure 12), to 
attempt distortion of a critical function such 
as light beams command (AgCanRx) by 
setting the beams to off when they must be 
set on. 
 
Figure 12. Memory access error injection 
• An infinite loop (see Figure 13), for example, 
to simulate hardware failure which diverts 
the exit condition of a test. 
 
Figure 13. Quota error injection 
• And interferences on interrupt occurrences 
(see Figure 14), to simulate interrupt burst or 
bad plug connector. 
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Figure 14. Interference error injection 
In actual automotive controllers, such errors can lead 
to undesirable failures and, in the worst case, a loss 
of all functions as a result of restarting the controller. 
With PharOS, each error was detected and confined 
at the level of the task responsible for the failure (see 
Figure 15); the sources and nature of errors were 
logged in the EEPROM memory for later diagnostics. 
Subsequently, a recovery procedure was engaged 
for the faulty task in order to restart it after a 
specified delay of 2 seconds (see Figure 15). No 
other functions were disturbed during this recovery 
process. 
 
Figure 15. Application temporal diagram 
The development of the industrial case has 
established the feasibility of PharOS in an 
automotive real case. So, ongoing work is now 
focused on achieving integration between PharOS 
and AUTOSAR. This paves the way for a modular 
software architecture where components reuse and 
modification is easier among vehicles: software 
component interactions and composition can be 
controlled to improve cost-efficiency without making 
any compromise with respect to quality and safety. 
6. Conclusions and prospects 
PharOS is a solution for next-generation of 
automotive controllers that enables implementation 
of the upcoming automotive safety standard 
(ISO 26262). It provides a new approach for the 
design and implementation of embedded real-time 
systems fulfilling also other important automotive 
requirements: generic software architecture, 
adaptability to hardware features such as multi-core 
one, reuse of safety-based mechanisms, software 
integration from different suppliers. As it is possible 
to define and control different temporal behaviors 
and operational modes of applicative and basic 
software designed with the PharOS kernel and its 
associated code generation tool-chain, development 
times and costs can be improved. Moreover, it 
enables integration of functions with different ASIL 
level on a same ECU, as the embedded protection 
mechanisms ensure freedom from interference 
between them and so paves the way to future multi-
domain ECUs. 
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